Animal Welfare Bill - Standing Committee A

[Mrs. Joan Humble in the Chair]

Animal Welfare Bill

Clause 20 - Entry and search under warrant in connection with offences

Shona McIsaac: I beg to move amendment No. 145, in clause 20, page 11, line 26, after ‘8’, insert
‘[Non-domestic animals in circuses],’.

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 146, in clause 28, page 13, line 31, after ‘30(9)’, insert
‘or [Non-domestic animals in circuses]’.
Amendment No. 147, in clause 29, page 14, line 8, after ‘8’, insert
‘or [Non-domestic animals in circuses]’.
Amendment No. 148, in clause 33, page 17, line 14, after ‘8’, insert
‘or [Non-domestic animals in circuses]’.
Amendment No. 149, in clause 36, page 19, line 2, after ‘7’, insert
‘or section [Non-domestic animals in circuses](1)(a),’.
Amendment No. 150, in clause 36, page 19, line 18, at end insert—
‘(e)in the case of conviction for an offence under section [Non-domestic animals in circuses], to anything designed or adapted for use in connection with the use or keeping of wild animals for the purposes of a circus.’.
Amendment No. 151, in clause 55, page 29, line 8, after ‘11’, insert
‘or [Non-domestic animals in circuses],’.
New clause 8—Non-domestic animals in circuses—
‘(1)A person commits an offence if he uses or keeps a wild animal for the purposes of a circus.
(2)A animal is a “wild animal” for the purposes of section (1) if it is—
(a)of a species not commonly domesticated in the British Islands (whether because the species is not domesticated in the British Islands at all, because limited time has elapsed since the species was introduced to the British Islands, because it is present only in limited numbers, or otherwise),
(b)of a species commonly domesticated in the British Islands but of a breed not so domesticated (whether because the breed is not domesticated in the British Islands at all, because limited time has elapsed since the breed was introduced to the British Islands, because it is present only in limited numbers, or otherwise) or
(c)of a kind designated by regulations under subsection (3).
(3)The appropriate national authority shall by regulations designate a kind of animal for the purposes of subsection (2)(c) if it appears to that authority, on the basis of scientific evidence, that the welfare needs of animals of that kind are unlikely generally to be met if they are used or kept for the purposes of a circus.
(4)A person commits an offence if he acquires for the purposes of a circus an animal which—
(a)is not a wild animal, but
(b)is of a kind which, at the time of acquisition, is not commonly used or kept in the British Islands for the purposes of a circus,
unless it is of a kind designated by regulations under subsection (5).
(5)The appropriate national authority may by regulations designate a kind of animal for the purposes of subsection (4) if it appears to that authority, on the basis of scientific evidence, that the welfare needs of animals of that kind are likely generally to be met if they are used or kept for the purposes of a circus.
(6)For the purpose of ensuring the welfare of animals to which subsection (1) applies and which have been used or kept for the purposes of a circus, the appropriate national authority may by regulations apply in relation to such animals—
(a)subsections (2) to (11) of section 16E of the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 (c. 37) (“the 1981 Act”) (obligations of zoo operator on closure of zoo); and accordingly
(b)sections 16F (power of local authority to dispose of animals), 16G (powers of entry) and 19(3D) to (3F), (4) and (5) (offences and penalties) of the 1981 Act,
with such modifications as the appropriate national authority considers appropriate.
(7)In this section “circus” means a place where animals are kept or introduced wholly or mainly for the purpose of performing tricks or manoeuvres at that place.’.
New clause 9—Circus animals—
‘(1)No person shall carry on the activity of training, keeping or using an animal for the purposes of, or as part of, a circus.
(2)A person commits an offence if he contravenes subsection (1).’.

Shona McIsaac: I welcome you to this afternoon’s sitting, Mrs. Humble. I shall not delay the Committee unduly on the amendments, as they are consequential on the new clauses, which deal with circus animals, a serious subject that needs debate in this Committee. Parliament has been considering it for some time—since 1998, when “The Ugliest Show on Earth”, a report compiled by Animal Defenders International, was presented. The report looked at circuses and their animals and at issues of accommodation, health, travelling, training and the physical and psychological effects on animals of a travelling circus environment.
The report, which is key to our debate on the issue, revealed that animals kept in travelling circuses demonstrate abnormal behaviour patterns. Their welfare is certainly compromised. They travel or are incarcerated for excessive periods, and undergo cruel training practices and very poor husbandry. When the report was launched, some 200 Members of Parliament signed an early-day motion welcoming it and calling for a ban on wild animals in circuses.
I want to make it clear at the outset of the debate on new clauses 8 and 9 and their consequential amendments that I am not trying to ban circuses—I do not think anybody on the Committee would wish to do so—but the Bill must address the travelling that circus animals undergo. That travelling and incarceration are what most seriously compromise their welfare, so I address that issue in the amendments.
There are a number of examples of excessive travelling. Organisations such as Animal Defenders International, the Born Free Foundation, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and others have monitored circuses over the years to reveal  what the animals endure. They tend to spend much longer periods incarcerated than they spend on the road.
Animal Defenders International has compiled evidence that shows, for example, that a bear spent almost 39 hours in its container on the back of a lorry, with just a 15-minute break for a performance. Llamas were kept in small stalls, tethered to a rope measuring 1 m, for 96 per cent. of the time. An elephant, which was mentioned on Second Reading, was shut in its transport wagon for almost 18 hours, although the journey it was due to undertake was of only 25 miles and took 45 minutes. There were examples of horses being kept in transporters for more than 18 hours for that self-same journey. Nobody who keeps horses and takes them to events would consider keeping their animals in a transporter for that long. The conditions in which they travel compromise their welfare.
I will give an example that appeared in the news last week, which members of the Committee might have noticed. Although the case did not concern a British circus, it was reported in the Daily Mirror on 20 January and in The Cambrian News on 19 January. The headline in the Daily Mirror read, “Circus trip hell: hippo and rhino for Irish show endure nightmare journey before ... CRASHING”.
The animals belonged to an Italian circus named Il Florilegio, and were being transported to Ireland. The journey took them from Calais to Dover, and through England and Wales to Fishguard, but they could not get the ferry to Rosslare. The animals were therefore transported via a lengthy detour to Holyhead to take the ferry to Dublin. The crash occurred during that journey. It was discovered that the driver had no money when he ran out of petrol and that there was no food for the animals. After the crash, nobody inspected the animals—a hippo and a rhino that had been kept in close confines—to see whether they were all right.
That case demonstrates some of the difficulties. The animals were not kept by a British circus, but were being transported through Britain. Given such trade and the fact that this country is used as a transit route to get animals to Ireland, it is difficult to estimate how many animals are in the country at any one time. I hope the Minister gives some thought to that case. It is one of the most recent cases that show the poor conditions in which animals are kept while travelling—these even endured a crash.
There are many other welfare issues associated with keeping animals in travelling circuses, which are often related to the nature of travelling and the type of work that those animals are made to do. I have mentioned the excessive periods that some animals spend travelling or shut in transporters. Temporary facilities often lack environmental enrichment and space for exercise, and animals often travel while sick, injured or pregnant. Furthermore, violence and force are commonplace in the training regime of animals that are made to do complex and unnatural tricks. Also, animals are often grouped inappropriately.
There are many serious issues to be addressed, and I have further examples. The Born Free Foundation and the RSPCA produced a report that looked at Anne the circus elephant, the only elephant owned by a circus in the UK. It also looked at Ming the elderly black bear—I hope the Liberal Democrats will forgive me—and the poor conditions in which he is kept. Apparently, Ming is brought into the circus to drink a bottle of milk as part of his performance.

Norman Baker: Although I agree with everything that the hon. Lady has said so far, I assure her that Ming is being kept in very good conditions.

Shona McIsaac: It depends which Ming we are talking about. It can be argued that the conditions in which Ming the black bear is being kept are very poor. She is used at Peter Jolly’s circus and is in an unfurnished, outdoor cage, with a small trailer for an indoor enclosure, and the circus elephant has been observed chained by the front and back foot in a temporary stable tent. Those are unacceptable practices, and all that before we get to the big cats that are performing with the Great British circus. Again, the lions and tigers have been observed in very small cages in beast wagons approximately twice their body length.
The Committee has discussed the environment that the animals are kept in and providing for their needs. Although they may have been reared in captivity, these are still wild animals and they have all the instincts of wild animals. No member of the Committee or the Minister can believe that we meet welfare standards by keeping them in such enclosed spaces for such long periods and making them endure lengthy road journeys for up to eight months of the year. The standard of some of their winter quarters has also been called into question.
The number of animals in United Kingdom circuses is at an all-time low. There has been a drop from 1997 to 2005. If we take exotic species, domestic species and birds, in 1997 there were 350 animals in British travelling circuses while there are now 208. The drop is probably the result of three factors: the “Ugliest Show on Earth” investigation had an impact; foot and mouth certainly had an impact, because, as the Minister will confirm, circuses were restricted in travelling; and hon. Members may remember the Mary Chipperfield cruelty case of some years ago. Therefore, just three British circuses now have performing animals. There is no reason why the number should stay low—it could easily increase again—but, while it is at an all-time low, this is a good time to address the serious welfare and cruelty issues involved with travelling circuses.
The Minister looked a little dubious when I said that the number may rise again. Peter Jolly’s circus has recently been advertising for more wild animal acts for the 2006 season. One advertisement read:
“Wanted for forthcoming UK tour commencing March 2006. Bottle fed black bear cubs and lion and tiger cubs for new exciting wild animal big cage act. To enhance current fakir number”—
that is apparently an eastern magician—
“we also require baby alligators.”
I mentioned travelling. When I read that advertisement, I wondered how on earth travelling circuses meet the welfare needs of an alligator. It must be nigh on impossible to transport it without compromising its welfare. The advertisement says:
“Peter Jolly’s Circus require for 2006 UK tour, elephant act.”
We have mentioned that the elephant is the only one owned by a British circus. It continues:
“Would consider single animal act but would prefer minimum of two animals”.
That is evidence that the three circuses left are seeking to increase the number of exotic species performing.
I believe that public opinion is on our side regarding the introduction of some form of prohibition on performing animals in circuses; this is borne out by a number of opinion polls. For example, 72 per cent. of people questioned in a Mori poll in 1999 thought that the use of wild animals in circuses was not acceptable. In a 2005 Mori poll, 80 per cent. of those questioned thought that the use of wild animals in circuses was not acceptable. In an NOP 2004 poll, 63 per cent. of people questioned wanted an end to all animals in circuses and 65 per cent. of those questioned in a 2005 poll felt the same.

Andrew Rosindell: I agree entirely with the hon. Lady, but we need to be clear what type of animal should be banned from a circus. The definition of a wild animal is quite wide: many types of animals could be recognised as wild, as she has outlined. We need to be more specific. Would she ban all animals, or just wild animals and exotic species? If it is the latter, how should we define the type of animal that is banned? For instance, would horses be permitted to continue in circuses?

Shona McIsaac: I reassure the hon. Gentleman that I am only in the preamble to my argument and I shall address those issues later. One of the new clauses I have tabled would introduce a ban on wild animals in circuses and the other would introduce a ban on all animals in circuses. I tabled both new clauses because of concerns regarding the definition of “wild animal”. I shall go into that a little more when I reach my concluding remarks.
I mentioned that public opinion seemed to be on our side. The majority of local authorities that have been questioned about animal acts and wild animal acts in circuses do not allow them. Of those questioned, 39 per cent. have banned all animal acts, 17 per cent. have banned just wild animal acts and 21 per cent. of local authorities questioned say that they have never received a request from circuses with animals. Local authorities are already bringing in a prohibition on performing animals in circuses on council-owned land. Only about 22 per cent. of local authorities still allow that practice to continue.
The Great British Circus arrived in my constituency earlier last year. The local authority has strong views about circuses on council-owned land, but the circus was performing on private land. The local authority  was doing what it could, because it felt that standards of welfare would be compromised, but because circuses can go on to private land, local authority bans can be got round.
There may be strong views on the matter in my area because, as I mentioned on Second Reading, some lions escaped from a circus in Grimsby some years ago. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough (Ms Smith) has already mentioned that case in Committee. We may joke about it, but it was a serious case at the time. Animals do escape, as the lions did. Some of the men in the town who were enjoying a night out drinking were quite pleased to be told by the local police that they should not leave the pubs under any circumstances because their welfare might be compromised. The excuse that people were in a lock-in because lions were wandering round Grimsby was not believed by many people. In fact, one man was seriously mauled and the police rammed the lion to get it off him.
My hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Goole (Mr. Cawsey), now a Government Whip, was chairman of the police authority at the time and he recalls the police phoning him up on a Saturday night to say, “Mr. Cawsey, we’d just like to tell you that there are lions roaming around the centre of Grimsby.” Hon. Members will be pleased to know that my hon. Friend, who is well known for his animal welfare credentials, did not issue a shoot-to-kill policy. He did not want the lions to be hurt in any way. They were rounded up and caught, but one man was left traumatised by the mauling that he endured. I understand—my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough may confirm this—that even to this day the man is petrified by virtually every animal that he sees.
We have public opinion on our side. We know that animal welfare is compromised because of the conditions in which the animals are kept and because of the travelling, which is why I felt that I had to table the amendments. I alluded to that on Second Reading and said that I wanted to focus on the subject in some detail. The case for action has been made. In this morning’s sitting, the Minister himself said in response to questions about pet fairs that we did not wish to ban things in this Bill unless there was cruelty involved or the welfare standards could not be met. I hope that from what I have said already he will agree that standards are not being met and that there are cruel practices, so there is a case for action. The key question is how we achieve that.
I tabled a new clause that would involve a total ban—it is also backed by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew)—because of the difficulty of defining what is and is not a wild animal, a domestic animal, an exotic wild species or an exotic species. All sorts of definitions are used. In some of the discussions that I have had over the years with people who support the continuation of animals in travelling circuses, they have argued, for example, that elephants cannot technically be deemed wild animals because in India elephants are used to work for man. A similar point is  put about llamas; because in south America the llama is used as a pack animal, circus people argue that they are not technically a wild species.

Andrew Rosindell: I understand what the hon. Lady is saying, and we all share the same sentiments and want to protect animals, but surely the Bill relates to wild animals in this country. Clearly, an elephant is a wild animal in Britain. It may not be in India, but we are not legislating for India. I am concerned that if all animals are subject to a ban—and like the hon. Lady I am strongly in favour of animal welfare—dogs, horses, budgerigars and other animals used in a perfectly harmless way at circuses would also be banned. Potentially the circus could be undermined, if things were taken to that extreme.

Shona McIsaac: I accept that definitions raise certain issues. I should probably prefer the term “exotic species” to “wild animal” to get round some of the arguments of those involved in circuses and their supporters. Another argument that I often hear is that the lions or bears were bottle-fed when young and have always been around man, so they are in effect domesticated. There are problems, and I believe that we must get the definitions right if we are to protect animals and end the cruelty, suffering and compromised welfare in British travelling circuses.
That leads me to the question of horses, ponies, mules, donkeys, dogs—which the hon. Gentleman mentioned—and birds. Some people argue that we could impose a prohibition but exempt certain animals such as dogs. I have no problems with, say, a clown running around the ring being chased by a couple of dogs which are in effect that performer’s pets. Horses are another matter, because the time that they spend being transported leads me to worry about their welfare. Racehorses and ponies being taken to gymkhanas, for example, do not spend such a long time being transported, and they will return to a permanent location, whereas circus horses may travel for eight months of the year. The welfare of circus horses during travel is therefore a worry. Horses and other ungulates have also sometimes been seen tethered on very short ropes. That was mentioned on Second Reading. We do not like seeing horses tethered in a field by a roadside.
We need to do something. The amendments have been tabled to enable us to debate and explore serious issues about which animals should perform in circuses. Do we agree that elephants should continue to perform in circuses, as one circus is trying to get more? What about big cats, llamas, zebras and bears? We must consider their welfare. I do not think that many people are worried about the welfare of the dogs in British travelling circuses. They do not seem to be kept in; they run around the circus because they are in effect pets.
The possibilities are a total ban; a partial ban, with the exclusion of some species; or a good definition of what constitutes a wild animal or, as I should prefer, to get around some of the circus arguments, an exotic species. I also wonder, and I want the Minister’s officials to explore this, whether there is some way of  applying or extending the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 to include travelling circuses and the winter quarters in which animals are kept.
There is certainly a case for having exactly the same standards for winter quarters as for animals in zoos. I tried to raise this point in one of our earlier sittings. For three or four months a year, a bear, tiger or lion kept in winter quarters is the same as one kept in a zoo, yet one is regulated and one is not. Winter quarters are rarely inspected; indeed, one local authority that has in its area the winter quarters of a circus cannot remember the last time that circus was inspected.

Ben Bradshaw: Does my hon. Friend acknowledge that that is exactly the sort of thing that can be done by regulation but is difficult to do in a Bill?

Shona McIsaac: I shall keep quoting back to the Minister his earlier comment that we should not ban anything unless cruelty is demonstrated or the welfare needs of the animal cannot be met. We have made the case that there is cruelty and that the welfare of animals in travelling circuses is compromised. If there is a way of dealing with this issue in the Bill, I would like the Minister and his officials to explore how we can strengthen it to achieve the aims that I have set out today. That is why I mention the 1981 Act. Can it be extended? Can other regulations be applied or extended to cover animals travelling with circuses?
We have only to make a comparison with the rules regarding livestock. There are strict rules about how long farm animals can be transported and about the conditions in which they can be kept. We have regulations about the size of cages in which hens can be kept, and we are to phase out battery production in this country, so hens are getting more attention and will be subject to a higher welfare standard than is applied to big cats and bears kept in cages. That is not acceptable. Can those regulations be applied to circus animals? There are many avenues that we can explore to get what I am after. The duty of care on welfare standards in the Bill is not sufficient. It will not make a blind bit of difference in circuses, which are difficult to inspect because their winter quarters are rarely inspected and because they move around. The very nature of that business makes it virtually impossible to ensure the welfare of the animals. That is why it is time to act.
I hope that the Minister will go away and consider some of the issues that we have discussed. Depending on his response to the new clauses, I might want to make further contributions. I remind him that back in 1988, I think, when Animal Defenders International launched “The Ugliest Show on Earth”, he signed the early-day motion that called for a total ban on animals in circuses. Indeed, I recall that it was tabled by you, Mrs. Humble—[Interruption.] It was a long time ago, Mrs. Humble.

Philip Hollobone: I support the hon. Lady’s amendment and I commend her on her speech.
The use of all wild animals in circuses should be prohibited. The use of domesticated animals in circuses should be subject to annual licensing and codes of practice, which would specifically address the position of what would then be the remaining performing animals in circuses.
I understand that under the current law there is, effectively, no meaningful regulation of circuses from an animal welfare point of view. Those who exhibit or train performing animals have to be registered under the Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925, but that is essentially an administrative statute that contains no welfare provisions. For example, winter quarters for circus animals have been mentioned, but those are not subject to any registration or inspection regime and there is little information available on standards of care and welfare. Indeed, RSPCA inspectors have been refused access to circus animals in winter quarters.
The use of many wild animals in circuses is already prohibited in several other countries, including Austria, Costa Rica, Israel and Singapore. A recent study by the Euro Group for Animal Welfare, looking at the legislation and controls on circus animals throughout Europe, came to the clear conclusion that a circus environment is unable to provide for the needs of wild animals. The author of that report pointed to research conducted recently, showing that circus life is completely incompatible with the needs, in particular, of elephants, brown and polar bears, primates and big cats.
Owing to the mobile nature and commercial business aims of circuses, they regularly have to transport their animals, which are housed for long periods in accommodation principally designed for travelling. There may be inadequate space for normal movement, or non-existent exercise facilities, temperature requirements, ventilation and lighting.
A 2004 survey of local authorities looked at the number of UK circuses remaining that have animal acts and found that there was a total of 10 circuses with animal acts, of which only three had wild animals—including one Asian elephant, one black bear and lions, tigers and zebras. The fact that there are so few circuses remaining in this country with wild animals performing in them suggests that the general public do not want to see those circuses.

Shona McIsaac: I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman has read some of the research that reveals that audiences going to circuses without performing animals have increased significantly in recent years.

Philip Hollobone: I am grateful for that intervention. That is a worrying trend.

Shona McIsaac: No—more people are going to circuses without performing animals.

Philip Hollobone: I am relieved. I should have been worried if more people were going to see circuses with performing wild animals. That confirms the point that  I was trying to make, that it is not a popular activity. I would certainly not take my child to see a circus with performing wild animals.
All wild animals have evolved to express a range of wild behaviours, many of which cannot be expressed in a circus environment. Many such animals are housed in inappropriate social groups and are deprived of the ability to display their whole behavioural repertoire.
The hon. Lady made an interesting point about the extension of zoo legislation. Many species of animals used in circuses are the same as those kept in zoos. It is worth noting that there is extensive advice provided by the “Secretary of State’s Standards of Modern Zoo Practice”. However, although that may provide a minimum standard, the view of bodies, such as the RSPCA, is that even that is unlikely to be met by circuses that keep wild animals.
The Select Committee considered the issue and expressed its concern that the Government’s proposals do not go further. It criticised the Government’s logic in concluding that a ban on performing animals in circuses is not necessary. It said that DEFRA could distinguish between the use of wild animals and domesticated animals in circuses, with a view to prohibiting the former and licensing the latter. That is also my view, because the welfare needs of wild animals are obviously very different from those of domestic animals and more difficult for circuses, which are itinerant, to meet. Circuses should not be permitted to bring in new wild animals or to breed from their existing wild animal stock.
I congratulate the hon. Lady on tabling the amendment. I hope that she holds her ground and, if the Minister does not undertake to think about the issue, she will take matters further. It is my firm view and, I believe, that of most of my constituents, that the use of wild animals in circuses should be prohibited and the use of domesticated animals in circuses subject to annual licensing and codes of practice.

David Drew: I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Kettering (Mr. Hollobone) and the tour de force of my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes (Shona McIsaac). I will not speak for as long as that because many of my points were covered.

Shona McIsaac: My hon. Friend might have noticed that I did not take part in this morning’s debate so the Committee has probably had less of me speaking, although it was one long speech.

David Drew: It is not for me to shut up another Member. My hon. Friend gave a moving and erudite address. We know we have a friend on the Front Bench, as the Minister signed the early-day motion and I am sure he has not changed his mind, even though he has achieved high office. I know he will be working behind the scenes to do the decent thing.
I support new clause 9, but I urge caution because we are talking not just about circuses but about performing animals, a matter that arose in the Select Committee. We must look at the wording of the  proposal because it must also include the use of animals in television, films, theatre and promotional work. Even if we decided to ban animals in circus, it would be no good if abuse was still prevalent in other uses of wild animals.
Although I said that I would not go over the same ground, I want to make the slightly different point that in the pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, the Select Committee said that we were not sure how the Government would introduce secondary legislation to define the difference between domesticated and wild animals, if that was how we could encompass what most, if not all, of us want: the end of wild animals being paraded at circuses and in front of other live audiences. The Government need to do some work on the matter because one person’s wild animal is another person’s domesticated animal.
My third point is about international circuses. We should be unanimous in the view that we should not allow animals to be brought across the seas to this country, for two simple reasons: first, there is always the threat of disease, and not just foot and mouth, bovine TB and avian influenza. I have argued for a long time that we greatly underestimate the impact of animal disease and the possibility that it can cause human disease. There should be a precautionary principle, which would be easy to enforce in this area.
Secondly, whatever controls there are on performing animals in this country and whatever our good intentions, there is always a threat that animals could be—[Interruption.] This is the room for strange noises. There is always a threat that animals could be abused by others who use methods that we would not accept, usually to train those animals. There is therefore a reason for us to take an international perspective in dealing with this issue, and I hope that it will be tackled across Europe, if not further afield, given that countries have already banned wild animals in circuses and promotional work, in particular. Those are the points that I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to clarify.
 Finally, if we are to license such practices, at what height will the hurdle be set? It would be much easier to ban this practice, because the decision would then be clear-cut. From the Government’s perspective, that might not necessarily be the best way, because they feel that they can drive standards up. Furthermore, the list of different uses to which animals can be put might mean that there was still abuse in other areas, even though animals had been banned in circuses. However, I should like some clarity, and this is another issue on which the civil servants might have to beaver away so that they can work out what the licensing arrangement will look like. That will be fair to the industry, which will know that its days are numbered, while others will be absolutely clear about the standards that will apply if they continue to use animals in promotional work and they will be able today to start training and looking after those animals accordingly. If at all possible, they will be able—dare I say it?—to change the way in which they currently use their animals.

Norman Baker: I shall ask my customary question of the Minister: is there a free vote on the Labour Benches? If he wishes to tell me, that will save me intervening on him later; if he keeps quiet, I shall reserve the right to intervene.
I do not need to run through the problems with circuses, nor do I need to discuss the other circumstances in which animals perform, which the hon. Member for Stroud quite properly mentioned. Those issues have been set out very clearly. Suffice it to say that I agree with the analysis that circuses, in particular, are incapable of providing the conditions necessary to meet the basic requirements of exotics or wild animals—however one wishes to describe them. The case for a ban on using such animals has therefore been made. My position is not dissimilar from that of the hon. Member for Kettering (Mr. Hollobone). It is perfectly acceptable to use animals that are used to working with humans—dogs and horses perhaps—providing that there is a licensing regime for them. That is the compromise that I would want to see. However, I find it extraordinary that animals such as black bears are still used in circuses in the 21st century. That is the case with which the Minister must deal. Although we did not know this before, we now know that he supported the early-day motions mentioned earlier. I tabled some of them, so perhaps he even supported me. I am not sure whether he did, but I look forward to him doing so when he speaks this afternoon.
The public are moving away from the use of animals in circuses and are, indeed, coming to recognise that circuses can be intensely entertaining—indeed, even more entertaining—without animals. When it comes to this country, the Russian State circus is a fantastic spectacle, and it involves no animals at all. When people see an animal in a cage, there is an understanding that that is not right. That understanding was not there 20 years ago, but it is now, and that is one reason why attendances at circuses have been dropping.
However, I must issue a warning at this stage. The Minister might be hoping that circuses will wither on the vine, but that will not necessarily happen. We thought that the wearing of fur might wither on the vine, and for some years it did. However, some fashion houses are now marketing fur again, and it is becoming more acceptable to wear it. It is not a one-way street. The Government have not intervened in the selling of fur, but they recently intervened in fur farming. Indeed, they decided to ban fur farms, which was generally popular. They did not license them; they banned them. The Government realise that an outright ban is sometimes the most appropriate way forward. Yes, clarification of the definition of animals would be needed; and, yes, it is not entirely clear how that would be arrived at—which animals are wild and which are tame, and so on. Nevertheless, it seems to be the way forward.
The hon. Member for Stroud spoke about animals coming from abroad. I entirely agree with him except for the fact that it may interfere with European Union trade rules. Those who advocate such a policy might  find that it is not compatible with EU law, as we found with the attempted ban on live exports. That is another reason for banning the use of such animals in circuses. Allowing animals to be used, but only those that originated in this country or that now live here to be used in circuses would make it difficult to resist animals coming across the channel from other countries. In my view, that is a further reason for a ban. The sensible move suggested by the hon. Member for Stroud would not be enforceable under EU rules.

David Drew: I understand the limitations of EU legislation, but it seems strange in this day and age that a country like Britain, which had problems with its beef, could have its beef exports banned with no recourse, but that if we wanted to take unilateral action on circus animals we would not have the power. Surely something is wrong with the EU, rather than with what Britain wants to do.

Norman Baker: The hon. Gentleman has started on a rich vein and a very long road. I had better not go down it, except to say that one is regarded by the EU as a trade matter and the other as a matter of public health. Therein lies the difference. However, the way that the EU treated our beef was not appropriate under European law.
Lastly, I want to speak about the alternative to licensing. The Minister has been at pains throughout to state that this is an enabling Bill and that the details will follow later. He wants our agreement on the principle of licensing a number of activities. The implication is that licensing will be used to improve animal welfare. That has been the assumption throughout our consideration of the Bill. In most cases, I am sure that that will be the outcome. Indeed, I am sure that it is the Government’s intention. However, I came away from this morning’s discussion unconvinced that licensing pet fairs will improve animal welfare. Indeed, it may make matters worse, whatever the Government’s intentions.
I flag up the fact that licensing could have similar consequences. It could give a stamp of approval to an activity simply because that activity had not been banned or ruled out. If the licensing conditions are set poorly, inadequately or loosely, we could end up with a worse situation. We could end up with a pig and a poke—no pun is intended.
The hon. Member for Stroud was right to refer to the height of the hurdle. If hon. Members are not going to go for a ban on non-domesticated animals—the route that I, the hon. Member for Cleethorpes and others would prefer—we need an absolute assurance as to how high the hurdle will be, and what the Minister believes will be the consequences of putting a licensing regime in place.

Nia Griffith: Hon. Members have covered many points, so I shall be brief. We all accept that we cannot keep domestic cats in little carrying cages for days on end—we accept that cats like a little freedom, perhaps being able to use a cat flap so that they can go in and out of the house—but that is exactly  what these big cats are condemned to. Tigers are being kept in caged trailers with no tiger flap to allow them to go for a little run. We do not accept that circus animals should spend all their time being locked up or tethered so that they never have the chance to run at full speed, to catch prey or to socialise in the normal way.
It has been suggested that the Bill already allows for the banning of circus animals, as there is a clause that suggests that their welfare needs must be met. My concern is that that will lead to having to argue and prove a welfare case for each species of animal, whereas including a clear ban would send a clear message. Also, if animals will be coming from other countries, or traipsing through Britain to get to Ireland or vice versa, it would be much simpler if Customs officers could simply say, “No, you don’t come in.” That would be better than having to prove that a particular species that has not already been covered is not getting its needs met on the travelling and tethering marathon that it is undergoing.
If we are not to have a separate clause on the subject, I would like assurances from the Minister that there will be a way of making sure that case after case will not be brought forward before we can prove that the welfare needs of the animals—whether they are in circuses based here or abroad—are not being met. We have to make sure that we will not need a separate case for each species.
Also, we need to take the lead in the EU on this subject. A separate clause would send out a very clear message. We could use it to lobby other EU countries to follow suit, so that the majority of the 25 EU countries introduce something similar to the provisions in Britain and Austria. For those reasons, I want the Minister to think carefully about whether it would be better to go for a clause that makes the ban absolutely clear, or to land ourselves with an awful lot of sorting out just to achieve an end that could be achieved more simply by the new clause.

James Paice: May I apologise to the Committee for missing what was obviously a tour de force of an introduction to the amendments?
It seems that the universal view is that we do not like the idea of non-domestic animals in circuses. There is the issue of whether it is demeaning for the animal to perform, and, more importantly, the issue of welfare. I am slightly unsure about whether we should ban animals in circuses in the fashion suggested, but it is not that I disagree with what the hon. Member for Cleethorpes is trying to do. The issue is whether a ban in the Bill would be as flexible as we would like, because of the word “circus”. The problem is not the rest of the argument—I am happy with that—but the concept of “circus”.
The hon. Lady has given a definition of a circus, and I would not argue with it, but we all know that there are many other environments in which animals can be required to perform. I am certainly not a lawyer or parliamentary draftsman, but I am not entirely convinced that new clause 8—or indeed any definition—would deal with that satisfactorily. I am therefore more sympathetic to the idea of creating a  framework of regulation that would have the effect of a ban, and I offer as evidence the system that the Conservative Government developed in the early 1980s to prevent the export of horses for slaughter. There is no ban on the export of horses for slaughter, but we created a set of regulations to do with the conditions in which they should be exported, and it had the effect of a ban; that practice now does not happen. That is a much more flexible arrangement.
I wonder—I shall be interested to hear the Minister’s response to this— whether there is a way that we could say, “If you keep animals for the purposes of performing, you have to keep them according to the following welfare standards.” We would then create a set of standards that made keeping animals for performing unviable commercially and impractical in terms of space and so on. That would be analogous to the way in which we dealt with the export of horses. I am tempted to think that that would be a more durable solution, less open to abuse and to people finding loopholes in the system, than putting a ban in the Bill.
I want to record my fundamental view, which is that trying to keep wild or non-domesticated animals in the way that the hon. Member for Cleethorpes and others described—in circus conditions, particularly the travelling conditions—is wrong. There may be a better way of dealing with things, but I place on record my support for the principle that she is trying to achieve.

Angela Smith: We have had an excellent debate, which is defining itself in terms of whether Members believe that we need a ban—in the Bill or not—to deal with the problem of wild animals being kept in such confined conditions and being made to perform, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes pointed out, or whether we can achieve the same result by raising the standards of welfare to the point at which it becomes impossible to confine, keep and train animals to perform in circuses.
I am doubtful whether we can raise the standards to the point at which the practice of keeping animals for the purpose of performing at circuses would become unviable. Would that be effective? I would argue that if the standards can be raised to the point at which the practice would cease, why should we not produce the ban in the first place?
Is this not rather a roundabout way of dealing with the problem? Is this not a rather insidious way of dealing with the problem? To that extent I would like the Minister to reconsider.

James Paice: That is an important point. Much of what we are debating in the Bill concerns moral issues about welfare and cruelty.
If we created a set of regulations which we as legislators felt were of a sufficiently high standard to enable an animal to be kept according to all the rules that we discussed earlier in Committee, and somebody said, “Yes, I will meet that standard”, then we have met the welfare issues. To say, as I think the hon. Lady  is saying, that it would be impossible to make the standard high enough implies that she wants to stop using animals in a circus, not because of the welfare issues but because of other moral judgments, such as whether animals performing and so on are right. I am trying to get clarity. Are we judging this purely on animal welfare grounds, or are we making other moral judgments about the use of animals to perform?

Angela Smith: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, in which he drew attention to an important point. I think, ultimately, that every member of the Committee will have his or her own view on whether we can ever achieve a welfare standard that is good enough to justify keeping wild animals for the purpose of performing in circuses. There is a difference of opinion among the members of the Committee. That is the point that I was going to go on to make.
I agree with the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice) that we ought to ask the Minister to reconsider the issues, because they are complicated. He can form an opinion and come back on Report with a considered view on whether or not raising the standard is possible, or whether we may as well introduce a ban as part of a secondary legislation package.
I absolutely agree that we should not introduce a ban in the Bill. We ought to keep the enabling status of the Bill intact, but I would like the Minister to consider the complicated issues that have been outlined during the debate.
For the record, I do not think that the standards can be raised to the extent that we could justify the keeping of animals in circuses, but that is a personal view. I would rather the experts and the Government went away and looked at the issue in more detail.

Ben Bradshaw: This has been a useful and informative debate, which has given me and my officials a lot of food for thought.
An important issue that came up quite late on in the debate, raised by both the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, was that we should really be talking about performing animals in general. The issue goes much wider than just circuses. That is one of the fundamental concerns that I have with the amendments as they are here—putting a ban on wild, or all, animals in circuses into the Bill. The other sectors—audiovisual, film, TV, advertising and so forth—are growing and although there may be a disagreement on whether circuses are shrinking, that has been the case in recent years. The Government are keen to achieve what was well described by the hon.d¤Member for South-East Cambridgeshire: improvements in welfare across the board for performing animals. In a moment, I shall come to how we hope to achieve that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes made an excellent contribution. I congratulate her and all the animal welfare organisations that briefed her. She reminded me of the principle that I reminded Committee members about this morning and that  should be fundamental to our thoughts: that we should think very carefully about banning an activity unless we are convinced that it is unavoidably cruel or that the welfare needs of all animals involved cannot be met. On that point, I have a problem with what my hon. Friend advocated.
We should acknowledge that most of the wild animals used in circuses are, in fact, captive bred. With all species—my hon. Friend mentioned llamas, others mentioned a camel and even an elephant—there is a debate about where we should draw the line, not only on the animal’s definition but on whether it is strictly the case that it is impossible in circus conditions to meet the welfare needs of every animal that we would normally describe as wild. I am advised that it is not possible to say that categorically. For me, that doubt is one reason—a fundamental one—to oppose the banning of wild animals.

Norman Baker: I should like to be clear on this important point. Is the Minister saying that he can envisage circumstances in which, if licensing were introduced, the use of wild animals in circuses could continue?

Ben Bradshaw: We are talking about things that are some way down the track, but I am advised that it may be difficult to prove that it is impossible to meet the welfare needs of a snake, llama or zebra in good circus conditions. That is the implication of what I am saying, although in the case of most wild animals, it will not be possible.

Shona McIsaac: I hear what the Minister says about performing animals, but does he accept that one of the key aspects of this debate is the travelling that those animals have to endure and the conditions in which they are kept before and after those journeys? He talks only about standards in circuses, but I have great concern about the travelling outside the performances. Will he please consider that?

Ben Bradshaw: I was going to come to travelling in more detail later. I resisted the temptation to intervene when my hon. Friend mentioned travelling, as I did when she mentioned winter quarters. Travelling is another classic area that is better suited to regulation. However, I shall come to the points that she and other Members made on travelling in a moment.
The fundamental point I want to get across is that I share my hon. Friend’s concerns—in some circuses, current practices do not meet acceptable welfare standards. I also accept that it is likely that the welfare needs of some, if not most, wild animals cannot be met in circus conditions. However, both those concerns are best met by regulation rather than a blanket ban.
Almost in passing, my hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) identified the only European country so far that has, according to my advice, banned all circuses with wild animals, including all species of captive-bred wild animals. That country is Austria. That is related to the travelling and the free trade issue. I am also advised that Austria’s ban is  being challenged by the European Commission because of the possible infringement of the free movement of services. That highlights not only the difficulty that a lot of countries—such as Sweden, New Zealand, Germany and others that have good, high standards of animal welfare and have passed flagship animal welfare legislation—have had in grappling with this problem, but some of the difficult areas that members of the Committee touched on, such as moving around. In the event of a ban or robust regulations, any circus that crosses UK territory will be subject to our laws, for both the welfare offence and the cruelty offence. I listened carefully to the examples given by my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes and found it hard to detect among them a practice or circumstance that we all find abhorrent which would not fall foul of the existing cruelty offence or the new welfare offence introduced by the Bill. I hope that that reassures her to some extent.
The hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud highlighted the important point that the issue is broader than circuses. The definition issue, which was also debated in Committee, makes it more difficult to put a ban in the Bill. I am sure that members of the Committee are aware of the list of countries that restrict the use of wild animals in circuses. The restrictions are either species-based or make a distinction between captive bred and wild caught, but most are limited to species. That is exactly the sort of issue that we can deal with better and more effectively in regulations than in the Bill. Given those principles, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes will seek to withdraw the amendment.

Shona McIsaac: Given the duration of my musings on the subject, I do not think that my hon. Friend the Minister has addressed all the issues that I raised and some of my questions to him—for example, applying the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 to winter quarters. I think that it would be simple to do that, and something that we could do quickly. I am concerned that the proposed date for doing anything under the enabling powers of the Bill about performing animals in circuses is 2009. That is an unduly long time to wait when we are dealing with some of the most seriously compromised animals in the country. Therefore, I ask my hon. Friend to reconsider the date.
Before I decide what I shall do with my amendments and, subsequently, the new clauses, my hon. Friend the Minister must address the issue of winter quarters and the Zoo Licensing Act . Can he bring it in more quickly than 2009? My hon. Friend did not address the transportation issue in great detail, particularly the comparisons with livestock. I heard what the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire said about the export of horses for slaughter. If my hon. Friend the Minister wishes to intervene to answer any of these questions, he is more than welcome to do so.

Ben Bradshaw: I am advised that the laws that govern zoos explicitly exclude circuses, but that does not mean that we should not base any regulation or licensing system of circuses’ winter quarters on the  conditions enjoyed by zoo animals. I think that I am giving my hon. Friend the answer that she wants on winter quartering. The same is true of transport. It would be extremely difficult to meet the welfare standards that most, if not all, wild animals require. Again, that could be laid down in regulation.
We are looking at the timing. However, I offer one note of caution. As my hon. Friend may know, the Department has set up a performing animals working group and we are working closely with Performing Animals Welfare Standards International, which is a body that deals with the welfare standards of performing animals all over the world. We are talking about an international market, particularly when we think of Hollywood films and things like that.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Ben Bradshaw: I was in the process of responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes about the timing of secondary legislation. We have timetabled secondary legislation in the way that we have because of the nature of the issues involved. The question of circuses is going to be particularly difficult because it is a new area; the ones that we are dealing with first are generally regulated already in some form or another.
Given, however, the strength of feeling expressed by the Committee and the points raised by my hon. Friend, I shall reflect on whether it is possible to bring forward the timing of regulations applying to circuses, bearing in mind that they might impact on other areas that hon. Members feel equally strongly about.
I described the working group earlier, and its work on a draft code for circuses is well advanced. We hope that it will be finished this year. It will help to inform any action taken under the welfare offence in advance of any future secondary legislation. I hope that those words reassure my hon. Friend and that she feels able to withdraw her amendment.

Shona McIsaac: Given the length of that intervention, I forgot that it was one. I welcome the Minister’s commitment—

Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House.

On resuming—

Shona McIsaac: As I was saying, I welcome my hon. Friend the Minister’s commitment to seeing whether there is a way in which we can introduce the regulations governing performing animals in circuses. Similarly, I was also welcoming the fact that the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 may be reviewed to see whether it could apply to winter quarters.
I must also say to my hon. Friend that I believe that the 1981 Act could also address some of the concerns about performing animals supplied for television, film and other performances, because the facilities in which those animals are kept are similar to those in circuses. Travelling circuses are a completely different sub-set in that they are well understood, so concerns about performing animals could easily be dealt with under the Act. I would like him to reconsider the matter, which leaves us with travelling circuses to consider. Although I welcome what my hon. Friend said, I have further concerns and questions that I want to put to him before I decide what I shall do about the amendments and thus the new clauses when we discuss them at the end of the debate.
I have some questions about Performing Animals Welfare Standards International, to which he alluded earlier. My understanding is that PAWSI is an industry-based organisation, and my hon. Friend said that the codes of practice are well advanced. I have been informed by people who have attended those meetings that there has been no discussion of specific standards yet, which gives me some cause for concern. I would like him to comment on that if he wants to intervene.

Bill Wiggin: I have kept quite quiet in the debate so far, but I am concerned, because I believe that the Government have had extensive discussions with the circus industry about such things as codes of conduct, so the hon. Lady is making an important point. It would be helpful not only for the Committee but for the industry as a whole to know now whether all their discussions have been a waste of time. If they have not, that may influence how the hon. Lady feels about the clause.

Shona McIsaac: I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but as I said in our discussions about the conditions in which animals are kept and the travelling conditions of those animals, I am worried that the people concerned are the people who are drawing up the codes of practice. Our perceptions will be very different from theirs, which leads me to another point that I made last week about lawful purpose. The circus industry could argue that there is a lawful purpose in hitting an animal with a metal pole when training it to perform tricks. I am concerned that that could be seen as a get-out.
Animal welfare organisations that have provided much evidence to Committee members, such as Animal Defenders International, the Born Free Foundation, the RSPCA and the Captive Animals Protection Society, are extremely worried that discussions have been only with the industry. They are not confident that the code of practice will address the concerns about welfare that we in the Committee have all voiced and worried about in our discussions today. My hon. Friend the Minister is welcome to intervene on me with a response or to write to me on that issue. I was about to say that he could respond in the stand part debate, but this is essentially the stand part debate. He must address this point before I decide how to proceed with my amendments.

Ben Bradshaw: I might be able to help my hon. Friend. Perhaps I was not clear enough earlier; I should have made a more clear distinction between PAWSI and the Department’s working group. I understand that PAWSI is run by a small number of people, including a zoo vet, an animal consultant and someone from film production. Invitees to PAWSI’s council include the Dogs Trust, the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the RSPCA and a circus representative. PAWSI has prepared a rough draft of a code of practice, but the DEFRA working group has not yet considered it. The working group includes representatives from the Born Free Foundation, the RSPCA, the Animal Consultants and Trainers Association, the Kennel Club, the Arts Council, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Dogs Trust, the SSPCA, the Production Guild, PAWSI and the Association of Circus Proprietors of Great Britain, so it has a much wider membership. That group will, we hope, agree the code of practice. If it fails to do so the Government will have to bring forward regulations.

Shona McIsaac: I appreciate that assurance regarding the DEFRA working group. I hope, if we are to go down the standards route, that we will have high standards and, as others have said, that the hurdles will be set prohibitively high so that no circus could keep performing animals any longer. In a way, I wish that my hon. Friend the Minister had said in his response that the regulations would effectively mean an end to performing animals in circuses, but he did not go quite that far—neither did he on Second Reading. That is why I am being so persistent, because I need more reassurance on this point. Will the regulations mean an end to performing animals in circuses? That is a crucial point if he is to consider bringing forward the regulations to take effect from an earlier date. He is not intervening on me; perhaps we can correspond on this issue.

Ben Bradshaw: I think that I made my position absolutely clear earlier, Mrs. Humble.

Shona McIsaac: Well, I shall persist with the question: will the regulations mean an end to performing animals in circuses? My hon. Friend the Minister is not making any further comment on that.

Ben Bradshaw: With the greatest respect to my hon. Friend, she is asking whether regulations that are yet to be published and yet to be consulted on will ban all animals, including domestic animals—she did not specify wild animals. No, I cannot give her that assurance, and it is unrealistic and unreasonable of her to expect me to do so in Committee.

Shona McIsaac: That is very helpful, because it gives me more of a feeling of where we must go, and what those of us who want a ban must do to get it.
Definitions are a vital question; there has been much discussion of them and I have some concerns about my drafting of the new clauses. I have concerns about our definition of circuses, although travelling circuses are a well understood concept. As to wild animals, the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 provides a  workable definition of a wild animal, as does the Zoo Licensing Act 1981. DEFRA’s circulars also give guidance on that. However, I should like more time to reflect.
If the Minister is to reflect on the timing, I shall reflect on some of the definitions in my amendments—the definitions of “circus” and the definitions relating to animals and performance—to ascertain whether there is a way to table something a little tighter on Report, to deal with the Minister’s worries about how we achieve our aims. I shall do so on the understanding that he will consider some of the issues that we debated earlier, such as bringing forward the timetable and examining the 1981 Act with respect to winter quarters.
I shall reconsider my new clauses and amendments if the Minister will give me an assurance that he will also do some work before Report, to enable us to bring our positions closer with a view to achieving our aims. As he said, he does not believe that welfare standards are being met, because of the way the animals are being transported. Perhaps we can work together to end that cruelty and suffering. It is only on that basis that I am prepared to withdraw my amendments at this stage. It is more a question of my own drafting than of my hon. Friend’s comments. I still have worries. I think that we shall have to return to the matter on Report or in the House of Lords. I want the Government to table some simple amendments on Report to deal with the concerns raised in Committee about some of the most serious welfare abuses in Britain today.

Joan Humble: Does the hon. Lady want to withdraw the amendment?

Shona McIsaac: Yes. Do we also deal with the new clauses now?

Joan Humble: The hon. Lady must at this stage make it clear whether she intends to press the new clauses to a vote at the appropriate time.

Shona McIsaac: I appreciate that guidance, Mrs. Humble. It is a shame, because I wanted to buy more time to reflect before decisions were made on the new clauses. Reluctantly, I shall not press the consequential amendments and new clauses 8 and 9, but I reassure the Committee that the issue is not dead. Today’s debate is a step on the way to a ban, and I shall return to the matter on Report. I am sure that it will also be dealt with in the other place. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21 - Inspection of records required to be kept by holder of licence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Bill Wiggin: I shall keep my comments uncharacteristically short—certainly for this Committee. I should like to know what inspection records pet shop owners, in particular, are likely to have to keep for up to three years. I am concerned that the clause might place an extra burden of regulation on anybody who receives a licence. If I am right, I would like the Government to think about the issue; if I am wrong, and there is no onerous extra burden, this little clause stand part debate will give us an ideal opportunity to clarify the point.

David Drew: Like the hon. Gentleman, I shall be brief. I simply seek clarity from the Minister on one issue. The licence obviously implies that an inspection will take place, but will it set out which data will be required to be held, so that there will be some commonality in the format that inspections take? On the back of that, what format will that data be required to take? In some respects, the clause is innocuous, but we need to tease out what it really means.

Ben Bradshaw: I apologise in advance to both the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend. The difficulty is that we cannot say at this stage what records will be required to be kept, because that will depend on the licence conditions. The records that might need to be kept under existing licensing systems include those of animals kept on the premises, animals’ movements and a register of the licence holder’s employees. However, we have not yet published and consulted on the draft secondary legislation, and it is impossible for me to predict what details the licence holder will be required to keep.

Bill Wiggin: That is very honest of the Minister, although I am not sure that it is particularly helpful to the Committee. I hope that he will go away with the understanding that we do not want huge volumes of extra regulation. An enormous amount of record keeping is already involved in keeping farm animals, and whether it is all completely essential is a matter for the Government’s strategy for dealing with diseases. In this case, however, we are dealing with a rather different mindset, and I would be grateful if the Minister took the point away with him.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 - Inspections in connection with licences

Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 24, in clause 22, page 12, line 7, at beginning insert ‘Subject to subsection (4),’.

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 25, in clause 22, page 12, line 9, at end add—
‘(4)Subject to subsection (5), a Justice of the Peace may, on the application of an inspector, issue a warrant authorising an inspector to enter premises, if necessary using reasonable force, in order to carry out an inspection under subsection (1).
(5)The power to issue a warrant under subsection (4) is exercisable only if the Justice of the Peace is satisfied—
(a)that it is reasonable to carry out an inspection on the premises, and
(b)that section 46 is satisfied in relation to the premises.’.
No. 26, in clause 23, page 12, line 18, at beginning insert ‘Subject to subsection (4),’.
No. 27, in clause 23, page 12, line 20, at end add—
‘(4)Subject to subsection (5), a Justice of the Peace may, on the application of an inspector, issue a warrant authorising an inspector to enter premises, if necessary using reasonable force, in order to carry out an inspection under subsection (1).
(5)The power to issue a warrant under subsection (4) is exercisable only if the Justice of the Peace is satisfied—
(a)that it is reasonable to carry out an inspection on the premises, and
(b)that section 46 is satisfied in relation to the premises.’.

Norman Baker: The amendments are designed to tease out from the Minister the relationship between clauses 22 and 46, because it is not clear to me, although it might be clear to everybody else. The amendments would ensure that an inspector with a warrant had access to a licensable premises that was also a private dwelling for the purpose of carrying out an inspection without necessarily giving 24 hours’ notice of entry. That would aid the enforcement of the law, which I think is desirable.
Clause 22(3) specifically excludes entry into a private dwelling, unless 24 hours’ notice is given. However, clause 46 sets out four conditions. Under the fourth condition, which is set out in subsection (5), it is permissible to secure a warrant without 24 hours’ notice where
“it would defeat the object of entering the premises, or ... entry is required as a matter of urgency.”
It is certainly my view that inspectors should be able to secure a warrant without the occupier knowing in advance, which is how I read clause 46, and also where the matter is urgent. That seems to be at variance with clause 22(3). These amendments attempt to correct that. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify the relationship between the two clauses and specify exactly what the inspector’s powers are.

David Drew: I have little to add to what the hon. Gentleman has just said. We are now entering into the important issue about who the inspector is, on what grounds he can gain entry and who can confirm that he has done that correctly. I put my name to this group of amendments so that the Minister can answer those probing questions. He can also tell us what the failsafe is if things do not work as they should and animals are either taken when they should not have been taken or destroyed when they should not have been destroyed because of some misunderstanding of the terms on which the powers are being offered to those who have to take these difficult decisions.

Ben Bradshaw: Let me try to assist hon. Members. If I have misunderstood their queries about the clauses, I may have to write to them, but I am slightly mystified, as are my officials. Clauses 22 and 23 contain powers of entry to carry out routine inspections. They are not concerned with situations in which an animal is in  distress or in which an offence has been or is being committed. They are for routine, not emergency, inspections. I ask hon. Members to forgive me if I have got this wrong, but we do not find it easy to envisage a situation in which one would want to rush to a magistrates court for a warrant to conduct a routine inspection.
If there is a reasonable belief that an animal is in distress on the premises, the power to enter under clause 17 will be available. If one believes that an offence is being, or has been committed, on the premises, including carrying on a licensable or registerable activity without having licensed or registered it, a warrant for entry can be applied for under clause 20. In the absence of a need to act under clauses 17 or 20, we cannot see that the situation would be sufficiently urgent to require an ability to apply for a warrant.

Norman Baker: The Minister’s explanation has been helpful and has clarified matters. He will accept that spot inspections are often carried out under legislation. The Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 includes such a provision. Would he accept that, under certain circumstances, it is important that inspections can take place without notice and that that is currently prohibited under clause 22 as I read it?

Ben Bradshaw: I am not sure that that is the case, but I will write to the hon. Gentleman about that. Does he want me to finish reading my speaking note as it may help to clarify some of the other issues that he raised? I am not sure that I understood the point that he was making. I beg the Committee’s forgiveness.
The power in clause 24 was included on the basis that, in relation to farm premises, it may be difficult to satisfy the requirement of the clause, but that it would none the less be reasonable to conduct an inspection. A farmer may have had problems in the past, but on this occasion the inspector might not have a reasonable belief that an offence is being committed sufficient to satisfy the provisions in clause 20, perhaps because he had been denied access to the premises and the premises were sufficiently large that he could not see from a distance the condition of the animals. In that situation, it would still be reasonable for the inspector to inspect the premises.
In an equivalent situation on a licensed or registered premises, the inspector would have the additional leverage of threatening the withdrawal of the licence. This leverage is not available in the case of farms and it is important that the Bill fills that gap. This is where the difference between the clauses stems from. I hope that that has helped to clarify matters.

David Drew: I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and for being very honest in this regard. Let me describe the situation as I see it. On one occasion when I was out with RSPCA inspectors, we were refused permission to enter premises. The lady in question was a breeder. She admitted that, but she did not want to let the RSPCA on to the premises, because she felt that it was there because it had received complaints. She  wanted to know from whom the complaints originated before she would let the RSPCA on to her premises. I want to clarify whether, as a breeder, that lady would now have to be licensed. As a result, the RSPCA would have certain powers, although it would want to put neither itself nor the lady at risk. However, will my hon. Friend clarify whether the RSPCA would have additional powers to force the issue?

Ben Bradshaw: Inspectors will have the power to insist on an on-the-spot inspection. The definition of inspectors for the purposes of this part of the Act does not include the RSPCA. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend the clarification that he seeks. The RSPCA has not sought extra powers, and we are not giving it any.

Norman Baker: I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. I should appreciate a line in the post about spot inspections. Doubtless, other Members would appreciate one, too.

Ben Bradshaw: This clause allows spot checks of licensed premises without notice.

Norman Baker: I am again grateful to the Minister for clarifying matters. Will subsection (3) allow for spot inspections of private dwellings? That is the point about spot inspections with which we are not entirely happy. However, given the time that we have spent on other matters, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 23 to 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26 - Power of local authority to prosecute offences

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 212, in clause 26, page 13, line 8, at end insert—
‘(2)Proceedings for a crime under this Act shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Crown Prosecution Service or the legal department of a local authority.’.
The amendment is relatively small but quite important. Hon. Members from both sides of the House realise that, whatever our support for the Bill and subject to further proceedings, we are approving some major powers to deal with major allegations of animal cruelty and—if convicted—offences against animal welfare. In those circumstances, there should rightly be some checks and balances to ensure that there is no vexatious litigation for whatever purposes.
The purpose of the amendment is to try to bring English law into line with what we understand to be the conventions in Scottish law. The Bill contains no checks on prosecutions. The clause allows a local authority to prosecute proceedings for any offence under this legislation. Whatever one’s views of local authorities, they are not necessarily the right people to decide whether a clear offence has taken place. Private prosecutions might also take place prior to the commencement of any official prosecution by a local authority. We could make accusations of a violation  by the Minister or any other member of the Committee, regardless of whether we as individuals had any real expertise or the professionalism necessary to make that accusation. In view of the extensive powers of entry and other powers granted by the legislation, including the power to disqualify people who are convicted from continuing to own animals, it is important that there is some oversight of prosecutions.
A well established part of English law is that where there are such extensive powers, there should be some limit on who can begin proceedings, without interfering with the right of private persons to do so. That is why we are suggesting that the Crown Prosecution Service or the legal department of a local authority should agree to any proceedings. I understand that, in Scotland, prosecutions for offences relating to animal welfare are taken through on behalf of the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals by the procurator fiscal. That enables there to be an effective check on those prosecutions to ensure that time is not wasted and that they are sound. Obviously, the procurator fiscal would not take them forward if his professional opinion was that they were not sound. Amendment No. 212 is simply intended to bring English law into line with Scottish law.

Ben Bradshaw: As we have already discussed in Committee, the Bill is intended to be a common informers Act under which anyone—a private individual or an organisation—can take forward a prosecution if he or she thinks that they have the necessary evidence. That is not new or surprising. Since the 19th century, animal protection legislation has been enforced by the vigilance of private individuals and organisations, of which the RSPCA has been the most conspicuous example. The amendment would substantially fetter the existing right of private individuals or non-state organisations to launch prosecutions. In each case, as the hon. Gentleman has just said, prior consent would have to be gained from the Crown Prosecution Service or a local authority legal department.
We anticipate that most of the day-to-day enforcement work relating to pet animals under the Bill will continue to be carried out by the RSPCA. It has a long-established expertise in both the investigation and the prosecution of cases involving animal welfare. We believe that to fetter its rights as a common informer in the manner suggested would put an unreasonable burden on both the Crown Prosecution Service and local authorities, while not yielding any improvement in animal welfare. The RSPCA currently undertakes some 1,500 prosecutions a year. The fact that 97 per cent. of its prosecutions are successful suggests that its general approach is justified.
I have every confidence that the RSPCA will apply the same prudence to prosecutions under the new welfare offence as it does to prosecutions under existing powers. However, let me reassure the Committee that there are already several safeguards in our system to guard against inappropriate prosecutions. The Director of Public Prosecutions has  the right to intervene if a prosecution has been inappropriately taken forward, the courts have the power to make cost orders to punish a party that pursues unjustified proceedings, and any individual has the right to bring a civil claim for malicious prosecution. We do not believe that there is evidence to suggest that the current system is failing defendants, the wider interests of society or the welfare of animals. In that light, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister for his response. He is right that to say that there are fall-backs for individuals who feel that they have been unfairly prosecuted. They include the courts’ awarding costs.

Bill Wiggin: My hon. Friend is absolutely right: there are the safeguards that the Minister touched on. However, there is a big difference between an individual—in most cases, the prosecutions will be against individuals—and a charity or an organisation. If an individual is fined by the court, that person pays the fine. If someone works for a charity and the charity is fined, that person does not pay the fine; the charity does. The balance is different, and I wonder whether the Minister has really addressed that.

James Paice: My hon. Friend makes an important point. This has cropped up on many occasions and the Minister himself referred to it earlier, so I know that he is very conscious of concern that the Bill gives the RSPCA a much greater role, shall we say, in animal welfare. The Minister has repeatedly said, quite correctly, that the Bill does not extend the RSPCA’s powers at all, but there is concern at that greater role. Clearly, because we are creating a whole raft of new offences, with the duty of care and so on, one would expect the number of prosecutions to rise from that 1,500. It would be wholly improper to stand here and suggest that the RSPCA, or anyone else, brings unnecessary prosecutions. The statistics that the Minister has just used show quite the contrary. Nevertheless, there is concern.
The purpose in tabling the amendment was to try to draw out the sort of points just made by the Minister—to illustrate and, I hope, to allay those concerns. Most of the Committee recognises that the concerns exist, rightly or wrongly, in some sectors of society involved with animals. I am grateful for what the Minister has said and hope that he is indeed proved right, in that neither the RSPCA nor anyone else commences unnecessary prosecutions. In light of that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 - Time Limits for prosecutions

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 210, in clause 27, page 13, line 13, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
‘(a)before the end of the period of twelve months beginning with the date of commission of the offence, and’.

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 56, in clause 27, page 13, line 18, leave out subsection (2).

Bill Wiggin: The amendment seeks to change the period from three years to 12 months. It harks back to something I said a while ago on clause 21, about the length of time that people may be expected to keep records. We are talking about seeking to ensure that offenders are dealt with promptly, and interventions are made in the interests of the animal. The Bill, as a whole, concerns alleged harm to an animal’s welfare and therefore, potentially, actual suffering. In that case, it is important to begin proceedings as soon as possible. To allow a prosecutor three years suggests a lack of urgency.
The Bill will also mean that anyone caring for an animal—whether a pet owner, pet business, sanctuary, hobby or club—must keep records to ensure that they have fulfilled their duty of care. For a pet business routinely to keep all of its paperwork is an enormous practical burden. The vast majority of English and Welsh pet shops, of which I think there are 10,000—with the kennels, catteries and grooming salons—are micro-businesses employing fewer than five people. Yet over a three-year period those 10,000 will care for many hundreds of thousands of animals. While almost half of such businesses have a computer, most keep their routine check-sheets manually and work from premises with limited office space. That paper storage would pose something of a logistical challenge.
For pet owners, the challenge will be to diarise their pet-care routine, keeping vets’ bills and similar documentation that can be considered contemporaneous. Most pet owners do not, at present, do that. To ask them to do so for a full three years seems unnecessarily burdensome. The European Court of Human Rights has indicated that a delay of two years in bringing a case may be in breach of the convention, as memory is likely to fade beyond that period.
If an animal is an exhibit in a case, and belongs to the person likely to be prosecuted, keeping it in custody for up to three years—which I think the Minister talked about earlier today—may be unnecessarily cruel. Indeed, that three-year period exceeds the total life expectancy of some animals, especially small ones. When we consider the overall importance of the Bill and the points that I have raised, it seems only appropriate that the time scale is altered.
The intention of amendment No. 56 is to safeguard the rights of the defendant to receive a fair trial—principally, when there has been a significant time-lag between the alleged offences taking place and the prosecutors deciding to proceed. There is in the Bill an  implicit onus on the defendant to prove that the prosecution team may have known about the alleged offences for more than six months prior to commencing that prosecution.
I am of the opinion that the onus should always be on the prosecution to prove their case, which is why I tabled the amendment. That is particularly important when we consider that, in private prosecutions, it is possible for the evidence gatherers in a case to be the same group of people as the prosecutors. Although I appreciate that subsection (2) makes provision for a prosecutor to sign a certificate authenticating the date, I am not sure whether that will be good enough.
First, there is no way of knowing for certain that the certificate has been made on that date. Secondly, possibilities for fraud exist, especially when we consider that under subsection (2)(a) it is possible for someone other than the prosecutor to sign such a certificate on his or her behalf. Thirdly, in such circumstances, which are currently prescribed, our judiciary will be expected to rely on a mere signed certificate as sufficient proof. Although the amendment will dispense with the need for prosecutors to sign certificates, it will still place an implicit emphasis on them to be able to prove their dates. It will also urge prosecutors to prosecute more effectively, swiftly and justly.

Ben Bradshaw: As the hon. Gentleman has indicated, the clause would extend the time limit for prosecuting an offence under the Bill beyond the limit that would normally apply under the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. We have done that because enforcers have told us that with animal welfare offences it is often some time before an offence against an animal comes to light, and that can lead to difficulties bringing prosecutions under the current law. Often, an alleged offender cannot be prosecuted because once the evidence against him or her emerges, the case is time-barred. Amendment No. 210 would seek to reduce that time limit considerably.

James Paice: I have a genuine question. The Minister has obviously given the issue a great deal of thought. Can he give us examples, on the matter to which he has just referred, of the evidence in such cases regarding animals? Most of us would assume that animal cruelty is quite obvious almost immediately after it occurs. Will he give some examples of where the two-year period would not be sufficient?

Ben Bradshaw: The hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members will have had some rather stomach-churning examples drawn to their attention by animal welfare organisations; for example, the discovery of many emaciated dead animals that died long, painful deaths and had been stored in somebody’s freezer. Because that discovery happened some time after the offence had occurred, it was not possible, under current law, to prosecute that case. That sort of thing has been drawn to our attention and has made us think that the provision is justified. I will deal, in a minute, with the safeguards that we have included in the drafting.
Another reason we have chosen the three-year period is that it is the same as the one included in the Animal Health Act 2002, which extended the time limit in the Animal Health Act 1981 to three years, but with a six-month limitation, once the prosecutor becomes aware of sufficient evidence. It is sensible to impose the same time limit for prosecutions of welfare offences as for those relating to animal health.
Amendment No. 56 concerns the operation of the six-month limitation. Once the prosecutor becomes aware of the evidence the question is whether he should have to prove that he has not had the evidence available to him for more than six months, or whether a certification by him that he has not had the evidence available should be treated as conclusive. There are sound reasons for the approach that we have chosen.
First, it could be difficult and potentially hugely burdensome for a prosecutor to prove that he or she was not aware of the evidence—we would be asking them to prove a negative. In the absence of subsection (2), there is a risk that well-founded prosecutions could become sidetracked into arguments about when exactly evidence of the offence came to light and when exactly a decision was taken about the sufficiency of that evidence. That would waste the time and resources of the courts and the parties involved. Again, I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the 2002 Act, which contains the same time limits that we propose here. It also treats the certificate of a prosecutor as conclusive. We are not aware that that has caused any difficulties in that legislation. On that basis, I urge the hon. Member for Leominster (Bill Wiggin) to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: I am worried that the Minister is trying to have his cake and eat it. On the one hand, he wants a very long period in which offences can be prosecuted, but on the other, he is not happy for the prosecutor to mark the time at which the evidence has become clear. I objected to that during consideration of the Animal Health Bill because I had grave reservations about it. I am comforted to some extent that the problem has not become a major one, but there is a risk.
I am content to withdraw my amendment at this stage, but I reserve the right to return to the matter on Report if necessary. We have to be clear about the sort of offences we wish to prosecute, and what the Minister has said so far indicates that the Bill is not designed to escalate the number of prosecutions. However, this aspect of the Bill is designed to do exactly that, which runs rather contrary to what we have heard so far. The Minister should think about the three-year period; it widens the opportunity for prosecution. I understand why he wants to do that, but in the same vein, there should be clarity about when the prosecution has the evidence and wishes to begin. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 - Imprisonment or fine

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 158, in clause 28, page 13, line 34, leave out from
‘exceeding’ to end and insert £20,000’.

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 157, in clause 28, page 13, line 35, at end insert—
‘(2A)When a person guilty of an offence is imprisoned under subsection (1)(a) or subsection (2)(a), they shall not be eligible for early release through a “custody plus order” under Chapter 44 section 181(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.’.

Bill Wiggin: The amendment would ensure that punishments for offences committed under the legislation are consistent. While I appreciate that the maximum punishment a magistrates court can impose will be applied to those who have committed offences under clauses 4, 5, 6 and 7, I would like the sanction to be available for those to be punished under duty of care offences under clause 8—I am not sure that I agree with my notes on this.
I acknowledge that the decision to impose the maximum £20,000 fine will no doubt seldom be used, and presumably only in the most serious of cases. It is important that the Committee makes it clear that fines should not always be of the maximum size or just under; they should be considered. Magistrates should have the opportunity to sanction fines that exceed the £500 maximum for the other offences specified in subsection (2)(b).
The offences under clause 11(6) that deal with licensing and registration will be covered, so it would surely make sense to ensure that the maximum £20,000 fine could be made available to magistrates as well. After all, it is quite probable that businesses will be affected by the legislation, and I would like sufficient deterrents in place to ensure that businesses caring for our animals are ensuring their welfare.
My hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire raised the matter with the Secretary of State on Second Reading, but she did not justify the present position. She stated:
“If the hon. Gentleman looks at the legislation that the Bill replaces, he will see that there were similar differences. These are issues that can be explored in Committee. If the House feels that a change should be made, no doubt that can be considered.”—[Official Report, 10 January 2006; Vol. 441, c. 169.]
Here we are, considering it. As we are here to update the existing legislation and bring it into line with today’s standards, as the Secretary of State and Minister have frequently pointed out, it is only logical that we do not rely on 20th-century punitive measures for 21st-century crimes. With that in mind, I hope that the Minister will agree that the change is appropriate. I am sorry that my voice is so croaky, Mrs. Humble.
I tabled amendment No. 157 because I believe that those who commit the crime should serve the time. Nothing in the Bill prevents offenders from being eligible for the custody-plus scheme—a subject that I know is dear to my hon. Friend the Member for Putney (Justine Greening), who raised the point on Second Reading. I agreed with her entirely when she  pointed out that it is wrong that people who commit crimes against inanimate objects are sentenced for longer periods than those who offend against animals, who have feelings and emotions.
The provision would mean that some people who have committed the most atrocious crimes could face about 13 weeks in prison. My hon. Friend the Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) highlighted some despicable cases of animal cruelty. There was a case involving nine men and a woman who were prosecuted for dog fighting offences. I was appalled that the longest sentence handed out to one of them was only four months. Such short sentences are not sufficient either as punishment or as a deterrent, and the custody-plus release scheme should not be used in these circumstances. The public will have no confidence in a system that can permit someone responsible for the cruel death of an animal to be in prison for only three months.

James Paice: I shall speak briefly to support my hon. Friend’s amendments, especially the first one, to which he kindly referred in an intervention. The proposal is important to the public’s understanding of what we do in this place and of the meaning of legislation. Sentencing practice needs to be simple, clear and understandable.
Subsections (1), (2) and (4) contain puzzling discrepancies and the amendment would rectify the one in subsection (2). In all three subsections, the offence could lead to
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks”.
That is clear, and no one could dispute it. But most members of the public would expect the alternative penalty of a fine to be consistent, yet the fine is different for all three offences. If 51 weeks is the maximum period of imprisonment, the maximum fine should also be consistent for all three offences; otherwise they will lack credibility, and that is daft.
If an offence under clauses 8 and 11 or those subsections could lead to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or 51 weeks imprisonment, why is not that the case for an offence under clauses 4 to 7? If 51 weeks is the maximum term of imprisonment and magistrates decide instead to impose the maximum fine, they are constrained by different maximums. The ordinary member of the public trying to understand the criminal justice system, which is complicated enough, will wonder why, if there is consistency in the maximum term of imprisonment, there is no consistency in the maximum fine.

Justine Greening: I support amendment No. 157. As I said on Second Reading, I am anxious that the amendment should be accepted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster said, people convicted of dog-fighting offences were given a four-month sentence, which, arguably, was insufficient. Under the Bill, the maximum will be only 13 weeks, which is wholly inadequate. The Bill has  focused on animal welfare issues from the word go, and organised criminals will not be put off by custody plus from breaching animal welfare conditions.
It is important, therefore, that magistrates have the ability to give a substantial 12-month sentence if they feel that that is appropriate. At some point, it may be wise to give them the chance to give a longer sentence, but that is not the subject of the proposal. I urge the Minister to accept the amendment; most members of the public would wish him to do so.

Angela Smith: I have every sympathy with the amendments in the sense that there should be consistency in the fines and that we need to ensure that organised criminals are prevented from undertaking their vicious practices for as long as possible. However, penalties for offenders must be a combination of deterrent, punishment and protection for animals.
In respect of fines and imprisonment, the punishment factor and the deterrence value as it affects potential future offenders are in place. I welcome the increased penalties in the Bill, but I think that we need to balance the picture by recognising that the protection factor is the ban on the future ownership of animals. We need to remember that part of the package when looking at the clause.
In Sheffield last week, we had a terrible case brought to court by the RSPCA, involving a dog called Shogun, which has fallen from its ideal weight of 50 kg to 32 kg in the space of a few months. The dog was tethered to a metal post, hardly able to move, and was kept alongside—in fact, on top of—a pile of rubbish. The punishment meted out to the offenders was a conditional discharge of 12 months and a ban on the ownership of dogs for five years.

Bill Wiggin: One thing is that the ban is specific to dogs. There is a real weakness in the legislation that allows such people not to be banned from keeping an animal of any sort, and for a very long period of time. That would not be as a punishment, but as a precaution.

Angela Smith: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that valuable perspective.
I was going on to say that I would like the Minister to look at two things. One is the scale and terms of the ban, and whether that relates just to the animal over which the offenders were prosecuted or whether we would need to include all animals in such bans. Secondly, when someone has treated an animal in such a way, is a ban of five years sufficient? Is there anything that we can do in the guidance to ensure that animals are protected in the future through the use of the mechanism? In particular, lifelong bans are important in the protection of animals and they have to be used when necessary to protect animal welfare.

Ben Bradshaw: I am pleased that we have had the chance to have the discussion, because the issue was raised at some length on Second Reading. I know that it concerns hon. Members on both sides of the House. I am glad that there has been a broad welcome for the  quadrupling of the maximum fine and the increased possibility of longer prison sentences. I will come to the impact of custody plus in a moment.
I wanted to say to the hon. Member for Leominster that amendment No. 157 would disqualify anyone who has been convicted under clauses 4 to 7, and clause 8(11)(6) or clause 30(9) from early release under a custody plus order made under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. I am sure that he understands that disapplying the statutory sentencing framework governing custodial sentences for one category of offences is not possible.
The Criminal Justice Act introduced custody plus, which is a new structure for short custodial sentences and is designed to make them more effective in reducing reoffending. When implemented—it has not been yet—custody plus will apply across the board to all custodial sentences under 12 months. Under a custody plus sentence, offenders will serve their sentences in full, partly in custody and partly on licence complying with court-set requirements in the community. However, currently, all custodial sentences of 12 months or less are served only to their halfway point. At this point, release is automatic and the second half of the sentence is subject to no conditions whatsoever. We believe that such short custodial sentences give the Prison Service little time to work on the factors that underlie criminality and are therefore ineffective at reducing reoffending. Custody plus also provides an opportunity for the effective resettlement of offenders, which is key to reducing reoffending.
Under the current legislation, a maximum sentence of three months’ imprisonment can be imposed for offences of animal cruelty, which results in a maximum of three months spent in prison followed by no supervision in the community. However, all custody plus sentences will be at least 28 weeks and up to 51 weeks in total, and each sentence will comprise between two weeks and three months in custody, followed by a minimum of six months’ supervision in the community. During that period, the offender will be under the supervision of the probation service, subject to requirements such as unpaid work—which could be something to do with animal welfare, if that was deemed appropriate—a curfew, or drug or alcohol treatment.
The other issue that Members should be aware of is that it will be possible under the Bill to impose two or more custody plus sentences to run consecutively for two or more offences, provided that the total term does not exceed 65 weeks and a total custodial period does not exceed 26 weeks. The hon. Member for Putney is right to say that, for one offence, we are talking about 13 weeks in jail, but if there is more than one offence, it is possible for the courts to ask for the sentences to run consecutively.
I take the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough. Yes, the vast majority of people concerned about animal welfare want those who inflict terrible cruelty on animals to be punished properly, but their main concern is protecting animals. The welfare of animals is why we are all here to support the Bill, and it is far more effective to give the courts  scope, as the Bill does, not only for lifelong bans on ownership, but for lifelong bans on ownership of all animals, not just the animal involved in the case.
Amendment No. 157 would preclude those convicted of animal cruelty or welfare offences from a period of supervision following release from custody, and would thereby preclude the opportunity for constructive work to prevent reoffending. Amendment No. 158 would raise the maximum fine for the welfare offence in clause 8 from £5,000 to £20,000. The maximum fine of £20,000 for an offence of cruelty under clause 4 has already been quadrupled from the status quo and is designed to allow the courts more flexibility when dealing with very serious cases of animal cruelty, such as animal fighting, in which the suffering is deliberately caused, and cases in which the motive is financial.
In cases involving the welfare offence in clause 8, we would not expect there to be actual suffering; otherwise, the prosecution should have been for the cruelty offence under clause 4. It would not be sensible to have the same maximum financial penalty for both the welfare and the cruelty offences. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Leominster to withdraw the amendment.

James Paice: I understand the Minister’s argument that perhaps an offence under clause 8 is not as serious as one under clause 4, which relates to unnecessary suffering, but if that is the case, why is the term of maximum imprisonment the same?

Ben Bradshaw: Because that is what the magistrates courts can give as a maximum sentence. We wanted to reflect in the maximum fine the difference in seriousness between the welfare offence and the cruelty offence. I am thinking particularly of the organised criminality to which hon. Members have referred. We wanted to hit the people involved in such criminality in their pockets. At the same time, we wanted to reflect the seriousness of some welfare offences. We wanted to give the courts the flexibility to reflect that and the possibility of reoffending in the prison sentence. The most significant aspect of the Bill is that we have closed some of the loopholes relating to disqualification. Society at large will be most interested in protecting animals through disqualification, rather than in punishment and retribution.

Bill Wiggin: I shall deal with the second aspect first, if I may. I do not have a problem with the increase in the fine for the cruelty offences. In fairness to the Minister, the welfare offence is a lesser offence, so the fine is, rightly, lower. The odd bit is the prison sentence, and I am quite willing to accept that my amendment does not deal with that particularly effectively. As I understand it, a magistrates’ court may impose a sentence of up to 51 weeks, as compared with the signal that the Bill appears to send, which is that the prison sentence could be the same for either offence. I think that that is what the Minister has said.
I am not so happy with what the Minister said about people who are convicted. I hope that we all agree that a ban on ownership is not a punishment in itself, but a protection against further acts of cruelty. I was much more alarmed by the idea that people who have offended should be allowed near animals again. I cannot remember the Minister’s exact wording, but he was  concerned about working with those criminals—they are criminals by that stage—and preventing reoffending. I was going to say that that is madness and that we do not want someone who has been convicted of animal welfare offences to work in an animal welfare institution, just as we do not want paedophiles working in our schools. Then I realised that that was the most inappropriate analogy, because we have just had such a problem with this Government. I am sorry about that, but this is a serious point, and we need to be clear to the courts that we take such offences seriously and want the proper bans. We also want to make it clear that we do not want people convicted of animal cruelty to work in animal institutions unless there is supervision of such inordinate care that the person cannot possibly reoffend. I do not think that that will be possible.

Justine Greening: On that point, does my hon. Friend agree that it is important that we monitor how custody plus works in practice to ensure that when someone is out serving a community sentence, the sentence actually has some sort of impact on the person, and they are not just running around, free to do whatever they like?

Bill Wiggin: Yes, the Minister was at pains to point out that the provision has not yet come in. My hon. Friend’s point is absolutely valid; we want the punishment to fit the crime. I think that the Government want that, too, but as to whether they can achieve it, we will have to wait and see. However, it would be difficult to change this particular part of the Bill. We have got on the record what the Minister wants and what the Committee wants, and that is as much as we can do under the circumstances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 - Deprivation

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 176, in clause 29, page 14, line 20, at end insert—
‘(3A)The court shall not make an order for the destruction of an animal under this section unless it is satisfied, on the basis of evidence given by a veterinary surgeon, that it is appropriate to do so in the interests of the animal.’.

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 138 and 139.
Amendment No. 177, in clause 29, page 14, line 33, at end insert—
‘(5A)A person appointed under subsection (4)(a) shall be a veterinary surgeon or other person who the court is satisfied has the appropriate training and qualification in, and experience of, animal welfare.’.
Amendment No. 57, in clause 29, page 14, line 34, after ‘decides’, insert
‘to make an order or’.
Amendment No. 29, in clause 29, page 14, line 44, at end insert
‘, where it is appropriate to do so in the interests of the animal.’.
Amendment No. 178, in clause 31, page 16, line 16, at end insert
‘; and
(c)in the case of the destruction of an animal, it is satisfied, on the basis of evidence given by a veterinary surgeon, that it is appropriate to do so in the interests of the animal.’.
Amendment No. 31, in clause 31, page 16, line 27, at end insert
‘, where it is appropriate so to do in the interests of the animal.’.
Amendment No. 182, in clause 34, page 18, line 20, at end insert—
‘(3A)The court shall not make an order for the destruction of an animal under this section unless it is satisfied, on the basis of evidence given by a veterinary surgeon, that it is appropriate to do so in the interests of the animal.’.

Bill Wiggin: I shall try to keep my comments short. With amendment No. 176, we seek to make sure that everything possible is done to preserve the life of an animal that may have to be destroyed under the clause. Subsection (9) as drafted makes it clear that references in the clause to disposing of an animal include its destruction. Although I accept that the destruction of an animal under the clause would probably take place only in the most exceptional circumstances, I feel that it is nevertheless necessary to make ensure that it is to be done only when evidence given by a veterinary surgeon suggests that destroying the animal would be in its best interests. Magistrates are not suitably qualified to pass judgment on the medical condition of an animal, so the amendment would empower them to consult a veterinary surgeon, who is better qualified to determine whether an animal’s condition warrants an order for it to be put to sleep. That is a constructive little amendment, and I hope that the Minister agrees to it.
In keeping with the principle that science and expertise must be used to secure the welfare of our animals, amendment No. 177 seeks to ensure that the appropriate qualified person is appointed to carry out the functions detailed under subsection (4)(a). That is not made explicit in the Bill as drafted. The subsection states that the court can
“appoint a person to carry out, or arrange for the carrying out of, the order”,
but it does not give any criteria to determine who that person may be. I am sure that it is not the intention of the Bill to leave open the possibility of an inadequate person being required to carry out functions of the legislation. I covered the circumstances in which a person should be authorised to destroy an animal in relation to amendment No. 176, and the argument for amendment No. 177 is in a similar vein.
As a society, we need to know that animals are well treated and that we do not put them in a position where they are once again left vulnerable to being neglected or abused. If society, through the courts, judges that an animal should be treated in a certain way, we must be reassured that it will be done professionally and competently. If, for example, the court decides that an  animal is to be sold, we would want to make sure that that was done in a reputable way, through the correct channels.
With amendment No. 57, we seek to ensure that a court always justifies the reasons for its decisions; I am sure that the court would want to do so. Under subsection (6) as drafted, there is a responsibility on the court to justify its decision only when it decides not to deprive an owner of their animal. That is right and proper, but although I appreciate that in many circumstances a convicted offender should be banned from keeping their animals, that is not an automatic decision. I am puzzled as to why a court needs to give a reason for not enforcing a deprivation, but does not need to give reasons when issuing a deprivation order. That seems like a contradiction. A court should have a duty to give reasons when it makes an order, as well as when it does not make an order. If anything, that would make any future appeal or judicial review hearings easier, as those present will be able to see why the court made its original decision.
We are nipping through the amendments as quickly as we can, Mrs. Humble. Amendment No. 178 is similar to amendments Nos. 176 and 177, and to all intents and purposes serves to achieve the same aim of ensuring that the interests and needs of animals whose futures depend on the powers exercised by the courts are put first. We all know that one of the reasons for the need to pass the legislation is to update our laws so that they concord with scientific advances and medical evidence. I agree that that is necessary and important, which is why we want this to be seen throughout the Bill.
The amendment would ensure that in the absence of the owner being available, a qualified vet would be present to decide whether it was in the animal’s best interests for it to be put to sleep. I believe that in the owner’s absence, only an independent vet should provide the necessary evidence for that important decision to be taken.
Amendment No. 182 seeks to ensure that the preservation of an animal’s life will always be the priority when taking decisions under the legislation. The Bill does not explicitly state that the destruction of an animal involved in a fighting offence should be the decision of last resort. The Kennel Club has expressed concern about the matter, and I believe that we must act in the best interests of an animal, regardless of the offence that it commits. As such, we must sometimes be prepared to put the effort in to preserve its life.
Sadly, it is all too often in the best interests of an animal involved in a fighting offence to be put down, but it should always be done after examining the medical evidence given by a veterinary surgeon, who should always exercise his judgment on the basis of the animal’s wellbeing.

David Drew: I support the amendments but shall ask the Minister only about the role of the veterinary surgeon and whether the forthcoming legislation, which we hope will be introduced as a matter of urgency, will give that surgeon greater power and responsibility. So far as I can see, clause 29 increases the vet’s responsibility. Vets may already exercise such  power and responsibility under existing legislation, but under the clause it appears that the vet would have to decide whether to destroy an animal. I seek clarification of how that would affect their protection and the way in which they would then operate.

Greg Mulholland: We, too, support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Leominster. Amendment No. 29, like some of the other amendments that have been tabled, probes the question of when an animal should be destroyed. We certainly do not believe that there has been sufficient discussion about that, and I seek reassurance from the Minister that those issues have been properly considered.

Ben Bradshaw: This is a large group of amendments, which I shall try to break down as clearly as I can. In doing so, I shall speak formally to Government amendments Nos. 138 and 139.
I start by dealing with the amendments that relate to destruction in the interests of the animal. For ease of reference, those are amendments Nos. 29 and 176, which concern clause 29, amendments Nos. 31 and 178, which concern clause 31, and amendment No. 182, which concerns clause 34.
The Committee debated whether we need to include this sort of instruction to the courts when we considered clause 18. Overall, I ask the Committee to consider the same arguments in relation to these amendments. I find it difficult to envisage a situation, with the exception of a situation that involved fighting animals, in which a court would decide a case under the Bill without taking the interests of the animal into account. It goes without saying that the court will hear arguments on this point and will take the interests of the animal into account. However, hon. Members need to bear in mind the impact that their proposals would have on the ability of the courts to deal effectively with offenders. With that in mind, amendments Nos. 29 and 176 concern the power in clause 29, which is the power to confiscate animals. This is not only in the interests of the animal, but is aimed partly at punishing the offender. If he has been found guilty of a serious offence, possibly involving many animals and from which he possibly derives a profit, it is appropriate to deprive him not only of the animals themselves but of their value. That is what the clause allows. In the majority of cases, the court will want to consider the interests of the animals concerned, and a deprivation order will almost certainly be in accordance with the animals’ best interests. However, that will not always be the only factor to take into account. In some cases, animals might have to be destroyed when they have been removed. That is normal for farmed animals, and it might be necessary when the animal that is confiscated has been trained for fighting. Providing that the animals are dealt with humanely and appropriately, we do not believe that that should be ruled out.
Similar arguments apply to amendments Nos. 31 and 178 to clause 31. Under that clause, when a person has been disqualified, an order can be made for the removal of animals that he currently keeps in breach  of such an order. In that case, the owner is not deprived of the value of the animals, but the animals can be removed to prevent him from breaching his disqualification. Again, it will almost always be the case that removal and possible destruction are in the interests of the animal. However, if the animals that are seized are farmed animals or have been trained for fighting, it might be appropriate to order their destruction, even though it is not necessarily in their interests to do so. Again, we do not want to tie the hands of the courts when they enforce the law.
Slightly different arguments apply in the case of the destruction of fighting animals under clause 34, but again we believe that it is important to allow the courts discretion to deal with animals in the hands of offenders when those offenders have been convicted.
I turn now to the more procedural amendments to clause 29 and Government amendments Nos. 138 and 139. As members of the Committee are aware, I agreed to make several amendments to the draft Bill that was published in July 2004 in response to the recommendations of the EFRA Committee. One amendment that I agreed to implement was to insert a power to recover expenses under the Bill and, by an unfortunate oversight, the power to recover expenses has been inserted in all other relevant clauses, but not clause 29.
Amendment No. 177 would be an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with the freedom of the courts to perform their function. It would impose extra costs and burdens on the courts and other enforcers. Amendment No. 57 would oblige a court to give its reasons when imposing a deprivation order as well as when it chooses not to. We have included subsection (6) under clause 29 because the default position of the court should be that, if a person were convicted of an offence and if he were the owner of the animal that the conviction relates to, he should be deprived of that animal. He should not continue to care for it, nor should he be entitled to its value. If a court considers that the situation is exceptional, such that he should  continue to care for it or be entitled to its value, it should give an explanation why. However, if the court were merely doing what we would expect it to do in the majority of cases, we do not see why we should oblige it to state its reasons. On that basis, I urge the hon. Member for Leominster to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: On the last point, it seems that it is simply a difference of opinion. I made it clear that, if the court did not state its opinion, it was more likely to be challenged at a later date, which would make matters a little more difficult. As for the Government’s amendments, I have no great comments to make. The first one is sensible and the second a tidying-up exercise.
Our amendments were not intended to be damaging. They were well intentioned and important for reasons of clarity. I am sad that the Minister has not accepted them, although I understand why. The insistence on proper veterinary supervision at every stage is something that, unlike dealing with a road accident, could and should be done. When talking about animal welfare in such a way, we should be practising what we preach. I regret that the Minister does not want to take the amendments on board. There is no point in pursuing matters further into the night, but we can always return to them on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 138, in clause 29, page 14, line 29, at end insert—
‘(e)order the offender or another person to pay a sum representing the expenses of carrying out the order.’.
No. 139, in clause 29, page 14, line 33, at end insert—
‘(5A)Any sum ordered to be paid under subsection (4)(e) shall be treated for the purposes of enforcement as if it were a fine imposed on conviction.’. —[Mr. Bradshaw.]

Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Tony Cunningham.]

Adjourned accordingly at fifteen minutes past Seven o’clock till Thursday 26January at Nine o’clock.